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FREEDOM OF THE
MIND AND
JUSTICE BRENNAN t
JOHN J. REGAN, C.M.:'.
The international ideological struggle of the last quarter century has
been reflected in the controversies enacted in the courtrooms of our coun-
try during this period. Cases touching on religion, censorship, loyalty
and associations have been the domestic counterparts of the worldwide
conflict for the freedom of the human mind.
In this article two areas of controversy - freedom of speech and free-
dom of religion - will be considered. The tension or "public argument" (as
Rev. John Courtney Murray calls it) inherent in a pluralistic society has
centered, to some extent, about these two issues during recent years. In
the first part attention will be focused upon the citizen's right to express
himself in print, even though at times in an obscene manner, and the con-
current right of society to protect itself from obscenity through censor-
ship legislation. The attempt to balance the freedom of worship guaran-
teed by the first amendment with society's legitimate religious needs will
be considered in the second part.
The efforts of one judge, Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. of
the Supreme Court of the United States, to grapple with the problems of
constitutional theory and conflicting social values raised by these issues
dramatize the work of the entire judiciary during this period. Justice
Brennan has been chosen as the subject of this study because he joined
the Supreme Court at a time when litigation concerning these proceed-
ings was intense, and thus his values and reactions would be quickly
tested. In addition, his Catholicism presented a new factor not existing in
the backgrounds of the other justices of the high court at this time.
T For the observations of Mr. Justice Brennan which he made after reading this
article, see "Editorial Comment" in this issue at page 267.
* B.A. Mary Immaculate Seminary & College; M.A. St. John's University; LL.B.
Columbia University. Dean, Colleges of Liberal Arts & Sciences, St. John's
University.
Obscenity anid Censorship
One of the areas related to the first
amendment's guarantee of free speech and
press which has been a constant source of
litigation in recent years is obscenity.
Whether it takes the form of the "dirty
book" on the newsstand, the unmarked
envelope full of sex photos sent through
the mails, or the "adult" movie shown at
the local "art" theater, obscenity is of con-
cern to local, state and federal governments
as well as to religious groups, involving as
it does the delicate balancing of the public
interest in free speech with the public in-
terest in the moral fabric of society.
Historical Background
At common law the publication of ob-
scene printed matter was held to be a pun-
ishable offense in 1727.1 In the United
States some states used this ruling as the
basis for prosecutions, while others enacted
criminal statutes prohibiting the writing or
printing of obscene material.2 The common-
law rule became statutory in England in
1857 through Lord Campbell's Act.3
In the case of Regina v. Hicklin,4 the
English courts formulated a test to deter-
mine what material was to be considered
obscene under this statute:
I think the test of obscenity is this, whether
the tendency of the matter charged as ob-
scenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publica-
tion of this sort may fall. 5
The Hicklin test proved inadequate in
protecting the right of free speech. It per-
mitted the courts to judge a complete work
I Rex v. Curl, 2 Str. 788 (1727).
2Comment, 6 N.Y.L.F. 313 (1960).
3 20-21 Vict. c. 83 (1857).
- L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
5Id. at 371.
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to be obscene by reading only isolated pas-
sages out of context. The availability of a
book to a susceptible audience could also
result in a judgment of obscenity. Thus
adults might be deprived of a book which
might disturb the young. Finally, the Hick-
lin test made no provision for the literary,
medical or sociological value of a particu-
lar work, and it considered irrelevant the
author's motive in writing the book.
The test nevertheless became quickly es-
tablished in the American courts, but not
without objection. In 1913 Judge Learned
Hand overruled a demurrer to an indict-
ment for mailing Gandman's "Hagar Rev-
elry," but added a note of personal protest:
Indeed it seems hardly likely that we are
even today so lukewarm in our interest in
letters or serious discussion as to be content
to reduce our treatment of sex to the stand-
ard of a child's library in the supposed inter-
est of a salacious few, or that shame will for
long prevent us from adequate portrayal of
some of the most serious and beautiful sides
of human nature.6
The famous Ulysses case marked the first
departure from the Hicklin rule.7 Judge
Woolsey denied the motion of the United
States for a decree declaring the book not
importable into the country on the ground
that it was obscene matter under the Tariff
Act of 1930, and for the seizure and de-
struction of the book under the act.
Judge Woolsey declared that the author's
motive in writing the book was relevant in
deciding whether the book was written for
the purpose of exploiting obscenity, even
though this intent was not the test of obscen-
ity. He then defined obscenity as material
,; United States v. Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1913).
7 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5
F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), afl'd sub nor.
United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
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"tending to stir the sex impulses or to lead
to sexually impure and lustful thoughts." s
In deciding whether material was obscene,
the court should consider the book's effect
on the person with average sex instincts, just
as it would use the "reasonable man" test in
a tort action. Finally, the trier of fact must
read the entire work.
In affirming this decision, Judge Augustus
N. Hand formulated a new test for obscenity
which was a considerable advance over the
Hicklin norm.
[Wie believe that the proper test of whether
a given book is obscene is its dominant
effect. In applying this test, relevancy of the
objectionable parts to the theme, the estab-
lished reputation of the work in the esti-
mation of approved critics, if the book is
modern, and the verdict of the past, if it
is ancient, are persuasive pieces of evi-
dence .... 9
During these years the Supreme Court
was not called upon to rule directly on the
constitutional aspects of the regulation of
obscenity. As a result the law in this area
developed independently of the decisions
dealing with freedom of speech. The lack of
guidance from the Supreme Court on the
constitutional issues created a dilemma for
lower court judges trying to reconcile the
theories underlying the free-speech cases
with the decisions sustaining obscenity reg-
ulation.
Professor Kalven thus describes the con-
stitutional problems facing the courts:
The first revolves around the ambiguity of
the term "obscenity." The lack of precision
had in no way been abated by the slow evo-
lution of the test for obscenity, from the
measure of the impact of isolated passages
on the susceptible ... to the standard of the
S Id. at 184.
1 United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulyysses,"
72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934), affirming sub
nom., United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses,"
5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
impact of the whole upon the average mem-
ber of the audience.... At the time the
problem came to the Supreme Court it
could still be argued with some force that
the term was irreducibly vague and that all
definitions were circular-a poor predicate
for a law inhibiting free speech.
The second group of constitutional doubts
derived from the clear-and-present-danger
test. Toward what dangers was obscenity
legislation directed? Analysis reveals four
possible evils: (I) the incitement to anti-
social sexual conduct; (2) psychological
excitement resulting from sexual imagery;
(3) the arousing of feelings of disgust and
revulsion; and (4) the advocacy of improper
sexual values. 10
In 1957 the Supreme Court reached its
first important decision concerning obscen-
ity. A Michigan statute had made it a crime
to "publish materials tending to incite
minors to violent or depraved or immoral
acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of
the morals of youth. .. ." In Butler v. Mich-
igan1" Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a
unanimous court, held the statute unconsti-
tutional. He construed the statute as making
it an offense to sell to the general public a
book which might have a harmful influence
only on the young.
Professor Kalven believes that the Butler
case does more than merely shift the test
audience from the young to the average
adult, when the material in question is dis-
tributed to the general public:
The Court was saying that the average adult
is not merely the preferred test audience for
materials distributed generally; it is the con-
stitutionally required test audience. More-
over, if the state cannot bar materials
generally distributed by using their impact
on youth as a criterion of obscenity, it can-
not use the young at all as a justification for
regulation. That is, the state cannot justify
10 Kalven, The Metaphysics of The Law of Ob-
scenity, 1960 SUPREME COURT REV. 1, 2-4.
11 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
regulation on the ground that the regulated
materials might move the young to anti-
social conduct, or might excite the sexual
imagination of the young, or might make
premature disclosure of the "facts of life"
to the young in a vulgar and debased form.
Admittedly these are serious problems, par-
ticularly the last. They may well justify
intervention of the state keyed specifically
to distributions to children.
1 2
The Roth Decision
Justice Brennan entered the picture in the
obscenity decisions of Roth v. United States
and Alberts v. California, handed down on
June 24, 1957.13
Roth, an entrepreneur in erotica, had
been convicted of violating the federal stat-
utes prohibiting the mailing of obscene mat-
ter and advertisements for obscene matter.
In the Supreme Court he argued that the
federal obscenity statute violated the free
speech and press guarantees of the first
amendment, that the vagueness of the stat-
ute violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment, and that the statute im-
properly invaded the powers reserved to the
states and the people by the ninth and tenth
amendments.
Alberts had been convicted of violating
a California obscenity statute by keeping
obscene material for sale and advertising
obscene materials. Again, as in the Roth
case, Alberts phrased the issues on broad
terms in his Jurisdictional Statement to the
Supreme Court."4
Thus in both cases the Court was not
asked to rule upon the obscenity of the
materials actually involved in the cases. It
was free to deal with the abstract constitu-
2 Kalven, supra note 10, at 7.
13 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REV. 5, 21-22 (1960).
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tional issues of the regulation of obscenity.
The Court, speaking through Justice
Brennan, sustained the validity of bothi the
federal and the state regulations. The issue
of the cases was "whether obscenity is utter-
ance within the area of protected speech and
press."'1 5 By way of historical background,
he noted that the Court had in dicta of past
decisions assumed the constitutionality of
obscenity regulation. In the light of colonial
history, the first amendment cannot be read
as intended to protect every utterance. In
fact, at the time of its ratification, thirteen
states had laws prohibiting obscenity.
Justice Brennan recognized that "all ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social
importance - unorthodox ideas, controver-
sial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevail-
ing climate of opinion" are protected against
governmental restraint." Obscenity, how-
ever, is "utterly without redeeming social
importance."' 7 He cited as proof the facts
that over fifty nations have entered into
international agreements for its regulation,
and that twenty obscenity laws had been
enacted by congress in the last century. In-
deed, the Court itself had previously de-
clared that "such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas ... "18 Jus-
tice Brennan concluded: "We hold that
obscenity is not within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech or press.'"'1 As a
corollary, it was therefore unnecessary for
the Court to consider the issues behind the
"clear and present danger" test applied in
other areas of free speech.
Justice Brennan then formulated the ac-
ceptable test for obscenity: "Whether to the
15 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
11; Id. at 484.
17 Ibid.
Is Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571 (1942).
11, Roth v. United States, supra note 15, at 485.
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average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to
a prurient interest." 20 He was careful to
point out that not every portrayal of sex
was obscene.
Constitutional Theory
The thesis implicit in Justice Brennan's
statement of the issue in the Roth case has
been described as a "two-level speech the-
ory." At one level are communications
which, though unpopular and even hateful,
must be measured by the "clear and present
danger" rule. At the second level are com-
munications which are socially worthless.
Thus, to determine the constitutionality of
a ban on communications:
... the first question is whether it belongs
to a category which has any social utility.
If it does not, it may be banned. If it does,
there is the further question of measuring
the clarity and proximity and gravity of any
danger from it.22
Professor Kalven therefore argues that
the issue of the social utility of a communi-
cation has become as crucial a part of our
free-speech theory as the issue of its danger.
He believes that the concept of social utility
rather than that of history gives a firm basis
to the Brennan thesis that some communi-
cations are not protected by the first amend-
ment. It would be too much to say that Jus-
tice Brennan has constructed an entirely
new theory of free speech, since the two-
level theory has appeared in Supreme Court
decisions previously.23 It seems more accu-
20 Id. at 489.
21 Kalven, The Metaphysics of The Law of Ob-
scellity, 1960 SUPREME COURT REV. 1, 10.
I-1d. at 11.
-:1See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942).
rate to say that Justice Brennan's contribu-
tion has been to provide a rationale for the
traditional exclusion of certain types of
speech from the protection of the first
amendment.
The test of social utility presents its own
difficulties. The definition of obscenity must
be carefully framed and applied, since mate-
rial, once classified as obscene, will auto-
matically be subject to regulation. Professor
Kalven sees another difficulty in the test:
The Court seems to have assumed that the
only argument against the constitutionality
of obscenity regulation rests on the broad
premise that under the First Amendment no
utterance can be prohibited and that if this
broad premise were destroyed the argument
must collapse.24
Another problem is Justice Brennan's use
of history to prove the proposition that some
forms of expression have never been en-
titled to the protection of the first amend-
ment. Professor Kalven finds this technique
alarming in terms of what other propositions
might be proved by the same technique. "Is
it clear," he asks, "that blasphemy can con-
stitutionally be made a crime today? And
what would the Court say to an argument
along the same lines appealing to the Sedi-
tion Act of 1798 as justification for the truly
liberty-defeating crime of seditious libel?" 25
Professor Kauper is likewise disturbed by
Justice Brennan's use of history:
If the historical approach is used to exclude
obscene publication from the free press
guarantee, then it would seem also that the
historical approach would determine the
meaning of obscenity. Recourse to history is
not completely satisfactory since the crime
of obscene libel did not crystallize until
after the middle of the last century.2'6
24 Kalven, supra note 23, at 9.
25 Ibid.
26 KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITU-
TI'oN 67 (1962).
He adds that if history is important, then
perhaps the Hicklin definition of obscenity
would be controlling. But this test has been
rejected by a number of federal courts and
was rejected by Justice Brennan himself in
formulating the Roth test of obscenity.
It seems, therefore, that "social utility"
rather than history alone must be the pri-
mary test employed in determining whether
communication is protected by the first
amendment. But what standards should the
Court use in determining what types of ideas
are socially useful or of social importance?
Here we encounter the problem of weighing
competing values and choosing those which
have priority. It is precisely in this area that
Justice Brennan's opinion shows weakness.
He side-stepped the issue by appealing to
history, but as seen above, history may sup-
ply some rather undesirable answers. In
spite of his deft side step, he was forced to
make a choice of values. He chose to pro-
tect society against the deliberate arousal of
"prurient interest" through certain types of
printed matter, instead of allowing unlimited
freedom to publish such material. His rea-
sons for such a choice remain cloudy.
The Definition of Obscenity
Justice Brennan drew on the words of the
Model Penal Code of the American Law In-
stitute2 1 in formulating the definition of ob-
scenity. Professors Lockhart and McClure
conclude that the Court thereby laid down
two constitutional requirements for deter-
mining what is obscene. 28 The material must
be judged as a whole, not by its parts, and
it must be judged by its impact on the aver-
27 MODEL PENAL CODE, §207.10(2) (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957).
28 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REV. 5, 53 (1960).
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age person, not the weak and susceptible.
But the definition itself raises many prob-
lems, which will be explored in the follow-
ing pages.
Prurient Interest
The term "prurient interest" had rarely
been used in previous opinions of the Court,
thus giving rise to the question whether the
Court was using a circular definition. The
term "appeals" likewise makes one ask what
degree of causal relationship between the
material and the arousal of interest is re-
quired.
To the American Law Institute, "prurient
interest" is a "shameful or morbid interest
in nudity, sex, or excretion;" '9 it is "an
exacerbated, morbid or perverted interest
growing out of the conflict between the uni-
versal sexual drive of the individual and
equally universal social controls of sexual
activity."'" Material "appeals" to this inter-
est when, "of itself," the material has "the
capacity to attract individuals eager for a
forbidden look behind the curtain of privacy
which our customs draw upon sexual mat-
ters."
31
The draftsmen of the American Law In-
stitute used the expression "appeal to pru-
rient interest" to focus on the nature of the
appeal of the material - the kind of appe-
tite to which the purveyor is pandering.
This, the Institute pointed out, is "quite
different from an inquiry as to the effect of
a book upon the reader's thoughts, desire
or action. 32 -
But while the Supreme Court borrowed
the American Law Institute's expression,
29 MODEL PENAL CODE, §207.10(2), comment
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
30 Id. at 29.
31 Id. at 10.
32 Ibid.
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"appeal to prurient interest," it did not
accept the limited meaning which the Insti-
tute gave to that phrase. The Court said
that "material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to the prurient interest"
is "material having a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts" and went on to say, "We
perceive no significant difference between
the meaning of obscenity developed in the
case law and the definition of the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code."'33
Four cases decided in the October 1957
term of the Supreme Court furnish some
guidance, though of a negative nature, as to
what Justice Brennan meant by "material
appealing to prurient interest." Citing only
Roth or Alberts, the Court reversed without
opinion four United States Courts of Ap-
peals decisions that had upheld obscenity
censorship of: (1) the motion picture "The
Game of Love, '34 (2) an imported collec-
tion of nudist and art-student publications
containing many nude photographs, 35 (3)
"One-The Homosexual Magazine, ' '36 and
(4) "Sunshine and Health" and "Sun" mag-
azines.37 Thus nudity and stories appealing
to homosexual interest were not considered
by the Court to be obscene under the Roth
test.
The latest decision of the Supreme Court
in this area throws new light on the meaning
of "material appealing to prurient interest."
33 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 n. 20
(1957).
34 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S.
35 (1957) (per curiam), reversing 244 F.2d 432
(7th Cir. 1957).
35 Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180, (1957)
(per curiam), reversing 247 F.2d 148 (9th Cir.
1957).
36 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per
curiam), reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
3 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S.
372 (1958), reversing 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
The Post Office Department had barred
from the mails a shipment of magazines con-
sisting primarily of photographs of male
nudes designed to appeal to homosexuals.
This ruling was based on alternative deter-
minations that the magazines (1) were
themselves obscene and (2) gave informa-
tion where obscene matter could be ob-
tained, thus rendering them non-mailable
under the Comstock Act.3 8
In Manual Enterprises v. Day,39 Justice
Harlan, announcing the judgment for the
Court, stated that two distinct elements are
required for matter to be obscene under this
statute: (1) patent offensiveness and (2)
"prurient interest" appeal.4" The former is
a quality in a publication which makes it so
offensive on its face as to affront current
community standards of decency. 41 Justice
Harlan considered the inter-relation of these
two elements:
Both must conjoin before challenged mate-
rial can be found "obscene" under §1461.
In most obscenity cases, to be sure, the two
elements tend to coalesce, for that which is
patently offensive - will also usually carry
the requisite "prurient interest" appeal. It is
only in the unusual instance where, as here,
the "prurient interest" appeal of the mate-
rial is found limited to a particular class of
persons that occasion arises for a truly inde-
pendent inquiry into the question whether
or not the material is patently offensive.42
After conducting his own "independent
examination" of the magazines, Justice
Harlan concluded that they were "dismally
unpleasant, uncouth and tawdry," but that
this was "not enough to make them 'ob-
scene.' -143 He continued:
•.. these portrayals of the male nude cannot
3s 18 U.S.C. §1461 (1958).
39 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
40 Id. at 482.
41 Ibid.
42 Id. at 486.
43 Id. at 489-90.
fairly be regarded as more objectionable
than many portrayals of the female nude
that society tolerates. Of course, not every
portrayal of male or female nudity is
obscene.44
In retrospect, it is the Roth and Alberts
cases themselves which give us the best guid-
ance as to what material the Court thinks
is obscene. 45 The publications distributed
could certainly be classified as "hard-core"
pornography. Professors Lockhart and Mc-
Clure state that the Solicitor General had
sent a carton of pornographic material to
the justices during their consideration of
these two cases. 46 They are of the opinion
that this material must have had such a
shocking and revolting effect upon the jus-
tices that they could not have put it out of
mind. Therefore, they argue that the con-
cept of obscenity which the justices had in
mind in formulating the test included at
least "hard-core" pornography.
Pornography, the professors conclude
after a study of various authorities in the
field, is "daydream material, divorced from
reality, whose main function is to nourish
erotic fantasies of the sexually immature. ' 41
To this term must be added the qualification
"hard-core," in order to indicate that to be
obscene in the constitutional sense, non-
literary material must not only nourish
erotic fantasies but be grossly shocking as
well.4" This latter point seems to be the
same as the standard of "patent offensive-
ness" proposed in Manual Enterprises, al-
though the Court in that case expressly re-
44 Id. at 490.
45 It is ironic that in these cases the obscenity of
the publications was never at issue before the
Court.
46 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REv. 5, 59-60 (1960).
47 Id. at 65.
48 Id. at 66.
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fused to make this equation.49
It is interesting to note that the Court of
Appeals of New York has also equated ob-
scenity with "hard-core" pornography:
It focuses predominantly upon what is sex-
ually morbid, grossly perverse and bizarre,
without any artistic or scientific purpose of
justification... the obscene is the vile, rather
than the coarse, the blow to sense, not
merely to sensibility. It smacks, at times, of
fantasy and unreality, of sexual perversion
and sickness and represents... "a debauch-
ery of the sexual faculty." 50
This minimal approach to the regulation
of obscenity is also advocated by Rev. John
Courtney Murray, S.J.:
There ought to be a few, only a few, areas
of concentration ... I suggest that the chief
area is the "pornography of violence ...."
Mischief enough is done by the obscenities
that occur in the portrayal of illicit love ....
But here sex is at least rescued from full
profanation by its tenuous connection with
love, as love is still resident in lust. How-
ever, when sex is associated with, and be-
comes symbolic of, the hatreds and hostili-
ties, the angers and cruelties, that lie deep
in men and women, the profanation of the
most sacred thing in sex - its relation to love
and to the hope of human life -is almost
complete. It could move perhaps only one
step deeper into the diabolical-in that asso-
ciation of sex and blasphemy that pervades
the Black Mass.5 '
It is hard to escape the conclusion that
Justice Brennan meant only "hard-core"
pornography when he used the term "mate-
rial appealing to prurient interest" to de-
scribe obscenity in Roth. Unfortunately, the
Court has not yet defined this term.5 2
49 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,
489 (1962).
50 People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9
N.Y.2d 578, 587, 175 N.E.2d 681, 686, 216
N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
51 MuRRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 173 (1960).
52 See Mulroy, Obscenity, Pornography and Cen-
sorship, 49 A.B.A.J. 869 (1963).
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The "A verage" Person
What kind of man is the "average" or
"normal" person to whose prurient interest
material must appeal in order to be consid-
ered obscene? In what circumstances is he
the proper person to be so employed?
Some courts have described him as a
composite, representing all elements of soci-
ety, including the young and susceptible.5 3
Others, like the trial court in the Roth case,
have equated him with the man in the
street.54 In the Ulysses case, Judge Woolsey
referred to him "as a person with average
sex instincts ... who plays, in this branch
of legal inquiry, the same role of hypotheti-
cal reagent as does the 'reasonable man' in
the law of torts and 'the man learned in the
art' on questions of invention in patent
law.",55
Professors Lockhart and McClure find
difficulties in all these formulations. 6 The
"composite" test has many of the objection-
able qualities of the old Hicklin rule. While
the "man in the street" formula raises fewer
problems, yet it is not adequate to cover the
case of the common man who peruses mate-
rial of substantial aesthetic value for his own
private titillation, oblivious of its artistry.
Finally, the peculiar appeal of "hard-core"
pornography makes one question whether
there is any great value in the standard of
the "average" or "normal" person, consid-
ered either as the common man or as the
_1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass.
543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
54 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957).
The Court quoted the trial judge with approval.
55 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5
F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd sub.
n om., United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses,"
72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
56 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REV. 5, 72-73 (1960).
person of average sex instincts.
[H]ard-core pornography appeals to the
sexually immature because it feeds their
craving for erotic fantasy; to the normal,
sexually mature person it is repulsive, not
attractive. Consequently, neither the com-
mon man nor the person of average sex
instincts is a suitable hypothetical person to
use in determining whether hard-core por-
nography appeals to his prurient interest. If
this were the exclusive test, hard-core por-
nography would never be obscene, although
it is the one class of material now certainly
obscene.
5
7
It is the judgment of Professors Lockhart
and McClure that the "average" or "normal"
person test used in Roth is a means of stat-
ing a negative proposition, rather than a
positive statement in itself. In other words,
it is simply:
... a way of stating that the material dis-
seminated to the general public must not be
judged by its effects upon or appeal to the
weak or susceptible. If this interpretation is
correct, the kind of person to be used as a
standard in judging the effects or appeal of
constitutionally obscene material is undeter-
mined at this stage in the development of
constitutional standards governing obscenity
censorship.5s
Viewed in this light, Roth would impose
the "average person" test only when the
work is so marketed that there is at least a
reasonable possibility that it will reach a
representative cross-section of the commu-
nity. If this analysis of Roth is correct, then
a result such as that reached in Manual En-
terprises could be avoided. Material de-
signed for a special audience (homosexuals
in this case) would not be judged by its
effect on the "average person" who has no
contact with or interest in the work. A pre-
mium on perversity would be avoided.
Another result of thus limiting the "aver-
57 d. at 73.
58 Ibid.
age person" test would be to permit objec-
tionable material to be distributed to an
especially mature or educated audience
which has a serious purpose for its use, even
though the material appeals to the "prurient
interest" of the "average person."' 59
Contemporary Community Standards
What is meant by the "community" whose
"contemporary standards" are to be applied
in the determination of obscenity? Who is
to judge what are this community's "con-
temporary standards?"
One view is that Justice Brennan was not
speaking of the standards of local or state
communities, but indirectly of a national
standard." The Model Penal Code favors
this view. 61 It provides for the admission of
evidence of "the degree of public acceptance
of the material in this country." In the com-
ments, the draftsmen note that "evidence of
'public acceptance' in this country ... is
relevant under our definition of obscenity
to show that the material went beyond 'cus-
tomary limits of candor.' " They continue:
For example, a book could hardly be held
obscene in one county of a state if it ap-
peared openly on public library shelves and
in book stores throughout the state. And a
tribunal in one state is entitled to know that
a moving picture or book has circulated
elsewhere in the United States, that it has
been reviewed in responsible journals there,
and, perhaps that it has been adjudicated to
be or not to be obscene. Customs do indeed
vary among our states, but it would be
unfortunate to have no evidence on "public
acceptance," in a case where material is
challenged so promptly in a particular juris-
diction that the only opportunity to test
59 See United States v. Thirty-One Photographs,
156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
60 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 56, at 111.
"tMODEL PENAL CODE, §207.10(2) (d) (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1957).
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public acceptance has been in other states.
Also the divergence of custom between one
state and another is probably far less than
differences between various social and reli-
gious groups within any one state. Further-
more, since a large part of the responsibility
in this area has been assumed by the national
government enforcing federal obscenity leg-
islation, a country-wide approach is almost
unavoidable. That which does not offend
the sensibilities of most Americans is likely
to be in the area of controversial morals or
aesthetics, inappropriate for penal control.3
2
One might argue that the provision for a
jury trial in obscenity prosecutions which
many states have adopted means implicitly
that the jury will use only local or state
standards. Since the Roth case, however,
the Supreme Court has made an independ-
ent judicial review of all lower court find-
ings.6 3 The Court thus has the opportunity
to overthrow decisions based on local com-
munity standards and not in accord with
national standards.
The most recent word on this subject was
spoken by Justice Harlan in his opinion in
Manual Enterprises:
We think that the proper test under this
federal statute, reaching as it does to all
parts of the United States whose population
reflects many different ethnic and cultural
backgrounds, is a national standard of
decency. We need not decide whether Con-
gress could constitutionally prescribe a
lesser geographical framework for judging
this issue which would not have the intoler-
able consequence of denying some sections
of the country access to material, there
deemed acceptable, which in others might
be considered offensive to prevailing com-
munity standards of decency.64
Even the application of national stand-
ards is not entirely satisfactory. It is difficult
62 Id. at comment, 44-45.
3 See supra notes 33-36.
64 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,
488 (1962).
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to discover any national consensus about
obscenity beyond the repugnance of the
nation toward "hard-core" pornography.
The problem is analogous to the one of
judging whether a person has "good moral
character."6 5
Procedural Problems
Since the landmark decision in the Roth
case, Justice Brennan has devoted most of
his efforts in the area of obscenity regulation
to safeguarding the procedural rights of
defendants. 66
On the fundamental issue of prior re-
straint on the publication of obscene mate-
rial his position is clear. In Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago67 a majority of five
justices upheld a Chicago ordinance requir-
ing submission of all motion pictures for
examination by a censorship board prior to
public exhibition. The Court answered in
the negative the narrowly framed issue:
"whether the ambit of constitutional protec-
tion includes complete and absolute freedom
to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind
of motion picture."6s No judgment was
passed on the validity of the tests used by
the censor to evaluate the films reviewed,
nor was any indication of the content of the
motion picture in question presented on the
record.
Justice Brennan joined in Chief Justice
Warren's dissent, which saw the issue of the
case as presenting the "question of our ap-
proval of unlimited censorship of motion
65 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d
588 (2d Cir. 1951); Repouille v. United States,
165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947); Petition of R- - - -,
56 F. Supp. 969 (D. Mass. 1944); Cohen, Robson
and Bates, Ascertaining The Moral Sense of the
Community, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 137 (1955).
66 See Speiser, Mr. Justice Brennan and The Bill
of Rights, 11 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 15, 34 (1962).
67 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
6s Id. at 46.
pictures before exhibition through a system
of administrative licensing." 69 The dissent
recognized that prior restraint as a constitu-
tional bar does have exceptions, but that
these exceptions were never thought to in-
clude censorship of motion pictures. The
opinion also voiced serious objections to the
administrative procedure of Chicago's cen-
sorship system, an argument wide of the
issue to which the majority limited itself.
Unauthorized Censorship
Unauthorized censorship by governmen-
tal agencies lacking jurisdiction to reach a
judgment about obscene material has also
been of concern to Justice Brennan. In
Manual Enterprises, Justice Harlan stated
that magazines barred from the mails by the
Post Office Department were not obscene
because they lacked the quality of "patent
offensiveness" required by constitutional
standards.7 0 Justice Harlan also stated that
the obscene - advertising proscription of
Section 1461 of Title 18 of the United
States Code requires proof that the pub-
lisher knew that at least some of his adver-
tisers were offering to sell obscene material.
Justice Brennan chose a narrower ground
for reaching the same conclusion in a sepa-
rate concurring opinion, in which he was
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas. 71 He would reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals because the statute
under which the Post Office acted, being a
criminal statute, could not be interpreted to
authorize seizure of the mails and refusal to
mail by that governmental department.
After a painstaking survey of the legislative
history of the statute, he concluded that
Congress had not authorized the Postmaster
69 Id. at 50, 51 (dissenting opinion).
70 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
71 Id. at 495.
General to censor obscene material under
this statute. "The area of obscenity is honey-
combed with hazards for the First Amend-
ment guarantees," he wrote, "and the grave
constitutional questions which would be
raised by the grant of such a power should
not be decided when the relevant materials
are so ambiguous as to whether any such
grant exists." 1 2
The two vices of prior restraint and lack
of jurisdiction were found in a system of
"informal censorship" struck down in
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan73 as a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. The
Rhode Island Legislature had created a
"Commission to Encourage Morality in
Youth," which notified distributors that
books or magazines distributed by him had
been found objectionable and that notifica-
tion of this fact would be sent to local police
departments for possible prosecution. There
was no provision for notice and hearing
before publications were listed as objec-
tionable nor for judicial review of the Com-
mission's determination. The vice of the sys-
tem, in Justice Brennan's eyes, was this:
The Commission's operation is a form of
effective state regulation superimposed upon
the State's criminal regulation of obscenity
and making such regulation largely unnec-
essary. In thus obviating the need to employ
criminal sanctions, the State has at the same
time eliminated the safeguards of the crim-
inal process. Criminal sanctions may be ap-
plied only after a determination of obscenity
has been made in a criminal trial hedged
about with the procedural safeguards of the
criminal process. The Commission's prac-
tice is in striking contrast, in that it provides
no safeguards whatever against the suppres-
sion of non-obscene, and therefore constitu-
tionally protected, matter. 74
72 Id. at 500.
73 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
74 Id. at 69-70.
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"Guilty Knowledge"
While the Roth definition of obscenity
eliminated many of the problems encoun-
tered by state legislatures in drafting obscen-
ity statutes, not all such problems had dis-
appeared. A Los Angeles ordinance had
made it unlawful "for any person to have in
his possession any obscene or indecent writ-
ing, [or] book ... in any place of business
where.., books ... are sold or kept for
sale."75 The California courts had construed
the ordinance as imposing absolute criminal
liability, regardless of the defendant's knowl-
edge of the contents of the books he kept
for sale. Reversing the conviction of the
bookseller, the Supreme Court, through
Justice Brennan, held that the state could
not constitutionally eliminate all mental ele-
ments from the crime. To penalize book-
sellers "even though they had not the slight-
est notice of the character of the books they
sold," would, he reasoned, impose a severe
limitation on the public's access to constitu-
tionally protected material. "[T]imidity in
the face of absolute criminal liability" would
lead booksellers to "self-censorship, com-
pelled by the State ... affecting the whole
public, hardly less virulent for being pri-
vately administered. '7 6
Justice Brennan did not attempt to deter-
mine the nature of the mental element nec-
essary to satisfy the constitutional require-
ment. He recognized that circumstances
might warrant the inference that a book-
seller, despite his denial of knowledge, was
aware of a book's contents. But in a separate
concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter pro-
tested this failure to give "some indica-
tion of the scope and quality of scienter
that is required. ' 7 He preferred that the
75 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 148 (1959).
76 Id. at 154.
77 Id. at 162.
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Court acknowledge that "a bookseller may
... be well aware of the nature of a book
and its appeal without having opened its
cover, or, in any true sense, having knowl-
edge of the book."s
The majority opinion explicitly left open
the question whether an honest mistake as
to whether a book's contents in fact were
obscene need be an excuse. It has been
argued that the strong public interest in
encouraging dissemination of non-obscene
literature dictates an affirmative answer.79
Where "hard-core" pornography is involved,
such a defense would obviously be rejected
as untrue. But it would be very difficult for
a bookseller to determine in advance of a
judicial ruling whether a book is obscene, in
view of the evolving constitutional stand-
ards. To require that a bookseller sell such
a book at his peril would constitute a sub-
stantial deterrent to the sale of non-obscene
literature.
Yet this answer creates the danger,
pointed out by Justice Frankfurter, that
effective state control over the distribution
of obscene literature might be seriously
hampered. As a solution to the dilemma, it
has been proposed that where courts have
found a book obscene in declaratory judg-
ment proceedings or have issued an injunc-
tion against such a book, each bookseller
within the state could readily be given notice
of the decision, which notice would consti-
tute adequate proof of scienter.80
Trials and Warrants
Justice Brennan was one of four Justices
7 ld. at 164.
79 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REV. 5, 106 (1960).
so Id. at 106-107.
who dissented from the Court's decision up-
holding a New York law authorizing injunc-
tive action by municipalities to prevent the
sale or distribution of obscene material."'
Justices Warren, Douglas and Black dis-
sented because the statute imposed an inval-
id prior restraint. Justice Brennan, however,
dissented on an entirely different ground -
that the New York statute failed to provide
for the right to a jury trial. He placed a high
value on preserving the right to a jury trial
in this area, since the jury represents a cross-
section of the community and has a special
aptitude for reflecting the view of the aver-
age person:
Jury trial of obscenity therefore provides a
peculiarly competent application of the
standard for judging obscenity which, by its
definition, calls for an appraisal of material
according to the average person's applica-
tion of contemporary community stand-
ards.
2
The regard for a jury trial in this area, it
should be noted, is not shared by Justices
Black or Douglas or by Justice Harlan who
stated in the Roth case:
Many juries might find Joyce's "Ulysses" or
Boccacio's "Decameron" was obscene, and
yet.., no such verdict would convince me,
without more, that these books are "utterly
without redeeming social importance. '8 3
In another recent case, Justice Brennan
experienced no difficulty in convincing the
rest of the Court of the unconstitutionality
of a Missouri law permitting the issuance of
a search warrant for obscene publications in
an ex parte hearing by a judge who did not
even see the publication or specify the par-
ticular ones which were to be seized. 84 The
warrants authorized police officers to search
81 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,
447 (1957).
82 1d. at 448.
83 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 498 (1957).
s' Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
for and so seize all "obscene publications."
Justice Brennan, in a carefully worded opin-
ion, ruled that because freedom of the press
was involved, a state would have to be par-
ticularly careful in adopting procedures for
dealing with obscenity. He compared step
by step the Missouri procedure with the
New York procedure upheld in Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown.s5 While a limited
injunction had been allowed in the latter
case, the closely defined procedural safe-
guards surrounding this remedy had led to
its approval by the Supreme Court. But in
this case he thought that "procedures which
sweep... so broadly and with so little dis-
crimination are obviously deficient in tech-
niques required by the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent
erosion of the constitutional guarantees. 'sG
An Evaluation
An ethical or theological evaluation of the
current legal climate concerning regulation
of obscenity must begin with differentiation
in the functions of the legal and moral
orders. That which is obscene in the moral
order is not necessarily obscene in the legal
order. Thus a work may be called morally
obscene if its intrinsic tendency is such as
actually to arouse or is calculated to arouse
sexual passion in the viewer or reader, but
comparatively few works judged immoral
would be legally prohibited under the Roth
definition of obscenity and its later interpre-
tations.
St. Thomas pointed out the fundamental
distinction between the moral and legal
orders:
Human law is framed for a number of hu-
man beings, the majority of whom are not
85 Supra note 81, at 436.
so Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra note 84, at
733.
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perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do
not forbid all vices from which the virtuous
abstain, but only the more grievous vices
from which it is possible for the majority to
abstain; and chiefly these that are to the
hurt of others, without the prohibition of
which human society could not be main-
tained: thus human law prohibits murder,
theft, and suchlike. 7
Thus the law must consider the social
aspects of a ban on obscenity. It must ask
whether such a ban might have harmful
effects on the dissemination of ideas and the
distribution of literature, essential to the
political processes and intellectual growth
of a democracy. It must recognize that men
can be coerced only into a minimal amount
of moral action, especially in sexual matters.
In view of the American community's pre-
sumption in favor of freedom, the law must
make the advocate of constraint present a
convincing argument for its necessity or util-
ity. It will therefore often settle for a mini-
mum of constraint because of the conflict of
moral views in a pluralistic society. Mindful
of its nature, the law will be tolerant of many
evils that morality condemns.
This approach, however, is not without its
own dangers. It is very hard to assess what
are the right prudential limits of the tolera-
tion of moral evil. The state, independently
of any moral consensus of its members, is
charged by natural law to promote and to
protect objective moral values that are indis-
soluble from any just appraisal of the com-
mon good.
One questions whether the Court is accu-
rate in its appraisal that there is no moral
consensus in the community in controlling
obscenities beyond the area of "hard-core
pornography." The law must at times per-
form an educative function, as illustrated in
s7 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 1, 11, q. 96, a.2. (Domini-
can Fathers translation).
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decisions of the last decade concerning racial
segregation.
Governmental censorship is an essen-
tially negative weapon and leaves fundamen-
tal factors in the moral climate untouched.
Private voluntary agencies using procedures
analogous to the juridical must fill the
breach. But even here the danger is a con-
centration on censorship to the neglect of
encouraging the reading of good literature.
"Our chief problem... is not literary cen-
sorship, but literary creation." s8
THE RELIGION CLAUSES
Mr. Justice Brennan was the first Roman
Catholic appointed to the United States
Supreme Court since the death of Justice
Frank Murphy in 1949. At the hearing of
the Senate Judiciary Committee on his con-
firmation, Justice Brennan was asked to
answer a question submitted by Charles
Smith of the National Liberty League as to
whether his primary loyalty was to the
Catholic Church or to the Constitution.
Brennan replied:
Senator, I think the oath that I took is the
same as the one that you and all of the Con-
gress, every member of the executive depart-
ment up and down all levels of government
take to support the Constitution and laws
of the United States. I took that oath just as
unreservedly as I know you did, and every
member and everyone else of our faith in
whatever office elected or appointive he
may hold. And I say not that I recognize
that there is any obligation superior to that,
rather that there isn't any obligation of our
faith superior to that. And my answer to the
question is categorically that in everything
I have ever done, in every office I have held
in my life or that I shall ever do in the
future, what shall control me is the oath
that I took to support the Constitution and
laws of the United States and so act upon
SS MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 174 (1960).
the cases that come before me for decision
that it is that oath and that alone which
governs.88
"Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion nor prohibiting
the free exercise therof." In sixteen words
the Founding Fathers wrote into the Consti-
tution a sentence which is at once both a
fundamental tenet and a basic problem of
American democracy. The "religion clauses"
of this amendment were designed to prevent
the development of religious wars and per-
secutions which had characterized European
life since the time of the Protestant Refor-
mation by keeping the Federal Government
neutral in matters affecting religion and by
guaranteeing individual citizens the right to
believe and act according to their personal
religious convictions. At the same time, the
clauses were necessarily phrased in general
terms, leaving to later generations their
application to specific problems. The work
of interpreting these clauses was vastly com-
plicated by the fact that religious convic-
tions are such a fundamental part of human
nature and therefore lead so easily to con-
troversy. It is in this context that the nomi-
nation of Justice Brennan to the Supreme
Court took an added significance because of
his Catholicism.
89 Hearings before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, on the Nomination of William Joseph
Brennan, Jr. to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.,
p, 34, n. 40 (1957). Smith accompanied his organi-
zation's question to Justice Brennan with a state-
ment which speaks for itself: "We do not contend
that confirmation of the appointment of Judge
Brennan to the Supreme Court is illegal; we op-
pose it on the same ground that a Catholic in a
predominantly Catholic country would oppose the
nomination of a Protestant. This is a predomi-
nantly Protestant Country. In Catholic nations,
we believe, Protestants are not appointed to the
highest court." Id. at 32.
Before proceeding to describe and ana-
lyze Justice Brennan's opinions interpreting
the first amendment's religion clauses, a
short summary of the prior Supreme Court
decisions in this area is necessary as a back-
ground.
Judicial Interpretation of the
First Amendment
The Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause of the first
amendment involves two problems which
complement one another. To what extent
shall governmental interests expressed in
legislation override actions which violate the
law but are based on religious convictions?
On the other hand, when does governmental
action infringe upon an individual's religious
liberty?
The first cases dealing with the religion
clauses which reached the Supreme Court
concerned the former of these issues. In
Reynolds v. United States,"° the Court sus-
tained the validity of a statute declaring
polygamy illegal, in spite of appellant's argu-
ment that he had violated the statute be-
cause of his religious beliefs. The Court
reasoned that, while "Congress was de-
prived of all legislative power over mere
opinion," it nevertheless "was left free to
reach actions which were in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order."
It found that the statute was within the scope
of governmental authority and of general
application, and therefore could be applied
without regard for the religious convictions
of those whose acts constituted wilful viola-
tion of the law. 91
In Davis v. Beason,92 the Court sustained
00 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
91 Id. at 164.
92 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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the conviction of a member of the Mormon
church for conspiracy to pervert the laws of
the Territory of Idaho which required that,
prior to exercising his franchise, a voter
swear an oath that he was not a polygamist
or member of a group advocating this prac-
tice. The Court ignored the appellant's con-
tention that the statute violated Article VI
of the Constitution.93
While the Court considered the national
interest in upholding public morals was of
sufficient importance to justify a prohibition
against polygamy, the need for compulsory
military service was not of the same charac-
ter. The exemption from service granted to
ministers, students and members of religious
sects whose principles forbade participation
in war was upheld by a unanimous court in
the Selective Draft Law Cases.94 Chief Jus-
tice White abruptly dismissed the conten-
tion that the exemption was a violation of
the establishment clause, in spite of the fact
that the exemption was based solely on a
classification turning on religious belief.
The Court assumed a more neutral posi-
tion in Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of
California.9" Two students had been sus-
pended by the University when they ab-
sented themselves from R.O.T.C. classes
because of their religious affiliation. The
California courts denied the students' peti-
tion for relief, and after accepting jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court of the United States
dismissed the case for want of a substantial
federal question.
For the first time, the Court invalidated
state legislation in the area of religion in
93 It provides: "No religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public
Trust under the United States."
94245 U.S. 366 (1918).
95 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
00 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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Cantwell v. Connecticut,9" holding that the
liberty safeguarded by the free exercise
clause was also protected from state action
under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The decision also held
that the delegation of discretion to a public
official to determine whether a particular
cause was religious in nature was "censor-
ship of religion" and violated the liberty
guaranteed by the first amendment.
A new interpretation of the free exercise
clause began to emerge in Jamison v.
Texas. 7 The appellant had distributed leaf-
lets inviting the reader to a religious meeting
and advertising religious books for sale, in
violation of a city ordinance forbidding the
distribution of advertising handbills on its
streets. The Supreme Court reversed appel-
lant's conviction, holding that the religious
nature of the leaflet removed it from the
prohibition of the ordinance. Neither the
advertisements nor the invitation, even if an
admission fee were charged at the meeting,
would classify the leaflet as commercial in
nature.
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,18 the Court
granted religious literature greater protec-
tion than that given to non-religious speech
or literature. It invalidated a state tax on
agents and distributors of religious litera-
ture, because no state may "impose a charge
for the enjoyment of a right" granted by the
Bill of Rights. "Freedom of press, freedom
of speech, freedom of religion are in a pre-
ferred position." 99
Religious belief was again the occasion
for an exemption from state law in West
Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette,100 but
the Court based its decision that Jehovah's
97 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
98 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
99 Id. at 115.
100 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Witnesses could not be compelled to salute
the flag on non-religious grounds:
We think the action of the local authorities
in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on their
power and invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control.:0
The "preferred position" doctrine ran
into difficulties at its first test."0 The Court
found the interest of the states in limiting
child labor too compelling to ignore, in up-
holding the conviction of a member of the
Jehovah's Witnesses whose nine-year old
niece and ward distributed religious litera-
ture on the streets in the evening.
The doctrine was reiterated in Follet v.
Town of McCormick10 and was extented
in Marsh v. Alabama' to include the re-
strictions placed on the religious activities
within a "company town" by the owner of
the property.
Any attempt to find a common theme
running through decisions in the area of the
free exercise clause is hazardous. At least
these principles, however, can be gleaned
from the foregoing decisions: (1) religious
belief will not exempt an individual from a
law intended to further public health or
morals, °10 but it may win out when the law
attempts to set a pattern of conformity in the
expression of ideals or beliefs;10 (2) gov-
101 Id. at 642. Justice Brennan believes that the
key to this holding lies in the fact that attendance
at school was compulsory. School Dist. of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 252
(1963) (concurring opinion).
102 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
103 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
104 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
105 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, note
102; Davis v. Beasar, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Rey-
nolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
106 See, e.g., West Virginia Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, supra note 100.
ernmental action may not forbid activities
designed to disseminate religious beliefs,
even though the same activities may be pro-
hibited if they lack a religious nature, pro-
vided they are not contrary to public health
or morals; 10 7 (3) it is not the function of
government to determine what is a religious
cause;l"s and (4) the free exercise clause of
the first amendment is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. 0 9
The Establishment Clause
For the first 160 years of our national
existence, litigation concerning the estab-
lishment clause seldom reached the Supreme
Court of the United States. In most of the
cases concerning the free exercise clause,
the Court impliedly assumed that the two
religion clauses were separable and of inde-
pendent vitality.
The first comprehensive treatment of the
establishment clause was given in Everson v.
Board of Educ.10 The Court upheld the
plan of a New Jersey township for reim-
bursing parents for bus fare paid to trans-
port their children to private school.
Justice Black, writing for the majority,
expressed a sweeping view of the establish-
ment clause:
Neither a state nor the Federal government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another .... No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or
107 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, supra note 104;
Follett v. Town of McCormick, supra note 103;
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra note 98; Jamison
v. Texas, supra note 97; Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
108 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note
107.
109 Ibid.
110 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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practice religion .... In the words of Jeffer-
son, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to exert "a
wall of separation between church and
state."111
In spite of Justice Black's statement, the
Court held that legislation justified by a
secular welfare purpose was not a violation
of the establishment clause, even though
church schools indirectly benefited from the
legislation.
But in McCollum v. Board of Educ.,"'
the Court refused to permit the compulsory
educational machinery of the state to be
used for religious instruction in public
school buildings.
A different plan, however, which per-
mitted students to leave school premises
before the end of the school day to take reli-
gious instruction elsewhere, successfully met
constitutional requirements in Zorach v.
Clauson.11 While "government may not
finance religious groups nor undertake reli-
gious instruction nor blend secular and sec-
tarian education nor use secular institutions
to force one or some religions on some per-
son,""' 4 Justice Douglas recognized that the
separation of Church and State demanded
by the first amendment was not absolute.
The state was permitted to respect "the reli-
gious nature of our people" and to accom-
modate "the public service of their spiritual
needs."1'
The only factual difference between the
Champaign and the New York City pro-
grams was that the students released to take
religious education in New York left the
school premises in order to do so. To Justice
Jackson the distinction was trivial, "almost
"I Id. at 15-16.
112 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
113 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
114 d. at 313.
115 Ibid.
JUSTICE BRENNAN
to the point of cynicism." 1 6 Perhaps the
comment of Professor Kurland best summa-
rizes the reaction of many scholars to the
Zorach decision: "Even students of consti-
tutional law would prefer the honest and
open retraction utilized in the other cases to
the patently disingenuous method of revision
used in Zorach."'11 7
Again some tentative conclusions can be
drawn from the cases interpreting the estab-
lishment clause: (1) government cannot
enact legislation favoring one religious sect
over others or preferring religion against
non-religion;"" (2) the government cannot
use public school buildings for religious
instruction conducted by members of the
various sects, but it can accommodate the
class schedule in the public schools to allow
children to go outside the public school
premises for religious instruction; 119 (3)
government may enact a legislative program
designed to promote the safety of children
and involving no direct grants to church-
related schools, although incidental benefits
to the latter derive from the program;
12 °
(4) government cannot enact legislation
which shows preference for religious
sects; 121 and (5) the establishment clause
116 Id. at 323, 325 (dissenting opinion).
117 Kurland, Of Church and State and The Supreme
Court, 29 U. Cri. L. REV. 26, 77 (1961). Justice
Brennan sees a "deeper difference" between the
McCollum and Zorach programs. The former
"placed the religious instructor in the public
school classroom in precisely the position of au-
thority held by the regular teachers of secular
subjects." School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 263 (1963) (concurring
opinion).
11s See Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 113; McCol-
lum v. Board of Educ., supra note 112; Everson
v. Board of Education, supra note 110.
119 See Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 113; McCol-
lum v. Board of Educ., supra note 112.
120 See Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 110.
121 Ibid.
of the first amendment applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 122
These propositions will be compared
later with the opinions of Justice Brennan.
Justice Brennan's Decisions
New Jersey
While a member of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, Justice Brennan had taken
part in only one decision involving freedom
of religion. 2 ' The Gideons International had
arranged for the distribution of copies of
the King James version of the Psalms, the
Book of Proverbs and the New Testament
with the Board of Education of Rutherford,
New Jersey. These bibles were to be fur-
nished to all public school children whose
parents had signed forms requesting them.
Justice Brennan joined in the opinion of the
court that the distribution of bibles through
the public school system was a preference of
one religion over another and therefore vio-
lative of the establishment of religion clause
of the first amendment as incorporated in
the fourteenth amendment.
The Sunday Closing Laws
The first major test of Justice Brennan's
attitude toward the concept of separation of
Church and State came in 1961 in four cases
before the United States Supreme Court,
testing the validity of compulsory Sunday
closing laws. 1 24 In the first of these cases,
McGowan v. Maryland, the majority of the
Court, speaking through Chief Justice War-
ren and joined by Justice Brennan, upheld
122 Ibid
123 Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d
857 (1953).
124 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366
U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allen-
town, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
the conviction of employees of a discount
store who sold certain legally forbidden
articles on Sunday. After holding that the
appellants lacked standing to raise any ques-
tion of infringement of religious freedom,
the Court went on to deal with the "estab-
lishment" question. It stated that the estab-
lishment clause had its own vitality without
dependence upon the free exercise clause,
and therefore appellants had standing be-
cause they had suffered economic injury
allegedly due to the imposition on them of
the tenets of the Christian religion. But the
Court found that Sunday closing laws were,
in spite of their religious origin, now pri-
marily secular in character and purpose:
The present purpose and effect of most of
them is to provide a uniform day of rest for
all citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday,
a day of particular significance for the domi-
nant Christian sects, does not bar the State
from achieving its secular goals .... 12. [W]e
believe that the air of the day is one of
relaxation rather than one of religion. 126
Chief Justice Warren cited two reasons
for the specification of a particular day of
rest by statute: (1) the family and the com-
munity could share in a single day; and (2)
enforcement of closing laws would be
easier. 2
7
In Braunfeld v. Brown1 2 and Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Super Market,129 the em-
phasis shifted from the establishment clause
to the free exercise guarantee. The Court
considered the question whether a Sunday
closing law was invalid as applied to Ortho-
dox Jewish storekeepers who were com-
pelled, by their religion, to remain closed on
125 McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 124, at
445.
126 1d. at 448.
127 1d. at 452.
128 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
129 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1963
Saturday. In sustaining the validity of the
legislation, the Chief Justice reasserted the
proposition that the state had no power to
coerce belief; at its greatest the power ex-
tended only to the control of actions. But
even actions were not absolutely subject to
control by the state. He reasoned that to
strike down legislation which imposed only
an indirect burden on the exercise of religion
would radically restrict the operating lati-
tude of the legislature. The volume of cur-
rent legislation which burdens the free ex-
ercise of religion, coupled with the vast
number of religious denominations in the
pluralistic American community, led him to
conclude:
Consequently it cannot be expected, much
less required, that legislators enact no law
regulating conduct that may in some way
result in an economic disadvantage to some
religious sects and not to others because of
the special practices of the various reli-
gions.130
He drew this distinction:
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede
the observance of one or all religions or is
to discriminate invidiously between reli-
gions, that laws is constitutionally invalid
even though the burden may be character-
ized as being only indirect. But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting a general law
within its power, the purpose and effect of
which is to advance the State's secular goals,
the satute is valid despite its indirect burden
on religious observance unless the State may
accomplish its purpose by means which do
not impose such a burden.' 31
Justice Brennan dissented in the Braun-
feld 3 2 and Gallagher 133 cases. He contended
that the Jewish storekeepers were being
penalized for their religious beliefs which
130 Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 124, at 606.
131 Id. at 607.
132 Id. at 610 (dissenting opinion).
133 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,
supra note 124, at 642 (dissenting opinion).
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compelled them to close their stores on
Saturday, while the state forced them to
close on Sunday as well. He acknowledged
that the Sunday closing laws served a valid
secular purpose, but at the same time he saw
in them a violation of the free exercise clause
of the first amendment. In his view, legisla-
tion which infringes on constitutional rights
guaranteed by the first amendment is subject
to a more exacting standard than a statute
which collides with the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Such legisla-
tion must have more than a mere "rational
basis" for its adoption by a state legislature.
"Substantial state interests," found by the
majority of the Court to justify encroach-
ment on religious practices, were not suffi-
cient. The mere convenience of having
everyone rest on the same day does not jus-
tify "this substantial though indirect limita-
tion of appellant's freedom."' 13 4 As an alter-
native, he argued that the states should
grant exemptions from the Sunday closing
laws to those whose religious beliefs forced
them to close on another day of the week.
Justice Brennan agreed with the majority
that Sunday closing laws, because of their
valid secular purposes, do not establish the
Christian religion, even though incidental
benefits accrue to Christians as a result of
these laws. At the same time he agreed with
the other justices that these laws would have
to be condemned as an attempt to establish
religion if they could be justified only by
religious considerations. Thus, his opinion
is consistent with previous interpretations of
the establishment clause in holding that gov-
ernmental action serving a valid public
purpose by reference to civil and secular
considerations does not become invalid be-
cause it operates simultaneously to promote
134 Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 124, at 614.
religious interests. His thought is parallel to
the holding of the Everson case, that the
spending of public money to send children
by bus to parochial schools serves a valid
secular purpose even though it also advances
and helps a program of religious education.
Justice Brennan dissented, however,
when he considered the implications of the
Sunday laws in reference to the free exercise
clause, and he thereby departs from prior
constitutional interpretation. In proposing
that Sabbatarians be granted an exemption
from these laws as a matter of constitutional
right he breaks new ground. Chief Justice
Warren had carefully enumerated his objec-
tions, both theoretical and practical, to this
proposal. Professor Kurland has thus sum-
marized these objections: (1) such exemp-
tions undermine the purpose of a day with-
out the atmosphere of commercial noise and
activity; (2) they would require inquiry by
the state into religious beliefs; (3) they
might interfere with the effectuation of the
fair employment practices law; (4) they
would make enforcement of the laws diffi-
cult; and (5) they would give Sabbatarians
an economic advantage over their competi-
tors who must remain closed on Sunday, so
that Sunday observers might well complain
that their religions were the victims of dis-
crimination. 135
Justice Brennan quickly refuted the prac-
tical argument concerning discrimination in
hiring employees:
Most such anti-discrimination statutes pro-
vide that hiring may be made on a religious
basis if religion is a bona fide occupational
qualification. 186
He likewise saw little problem in enforcing
these laws:
13 Kurland, Of Church and State and The Supreme
Court, 29 U. Cri. L. REV. 1, 90 (1961).
IL3 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 615 (1961).
... the granting of such an exemption would
make Sundays a little noisier, and the task
of police and prosecutor a little more diffi-
cult. It is also true that a majority-21-of
the 34 States which have general Sunday
regulations have exemptions of this kind.
We are not told that those States are signifi-
cantly noisier, or that their police are sig-
nificantly more burdened, than Pennsyl-
vania's.13 7
It was rather on the level of first amend-
ment theory that he endeavored to put the
thrust of his dissent. He asked whether the
interest of the state in having everyone rest
on the same day is so compelling that it
entitles the state to burden the Sabbatarian's
freedom of worship. He distinguished the
infringements upon the free exercise of reli-
gion permitted in Reynolds v. United
States13 and Prince v. Massachusetts139 by
arguing that the interests of the state in
stamping out polygamy, "a practice deeply
abhorred by society," and in protecting chil-
dren provide a much stronger justification
for an infringement upon religious beliefs,
than does the state's interest in having every-
one rest on the same day.14 0
One might ask whether Justice Brennan
is prepared to grant exemptions from a law
forbidding polygamy to those who practice
plural marriage as a matter of religious con-
viction, or to grant exemptions from public
health laws to persons who are opposed to
medical treatment on religious grounds. His
dissent indicates that his answer to these
questions would be in the negative. It is the
writer's view that the underlying reason for
Justice Brennan's distinguishing these cases
from the Sunday law cases is not based on
constitutional principle but on subjective
preference. Justice Brennan has "balanced
137 Id. at 614-615.
138 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
139 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
140 Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 136, at 614.
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the interests" involved, a uniform day of
rest against the free exercise clause. He is
quite willing to substitute his judgment
about the relative worth of these interests in
place of the state legislature's judgment. In
reality, his dissent may be perfectly consis-
tent with the Reynolds and Prince decisions,
in that he happens to agree with the legisla-
ture's judgment in those cases. The difficulty
is that Justice Brennan gives us no constitu-
tional principles for distinguishing between
these cases, and thus does not increase the
predictability of future decisions in the haz-
ardous area of the free exercise clause.
Another serious problem in Justice Bren-
nan's dissent is his failure to answer the last
objection to the exemption proposal raised
by Chief Justice Warren who had ob-
served that Sunday observers might com-
plain of religious discrimination if Sabbata-
rians were permitted to gain an economic
advantage by remaining open on Sundays.
At issue here is the relationship which
should exist between the establishment
clause and the free exercise clause. An ex-
emption from a police regulation, framed in
terms of religious belief, seems to be a vio-
lation of the establishment clause, but Jus-
tice Brennan never discusses this possible
conclusion. He seems to have ignored some
of the later decisions, particularly Zorach,
which had indicated that there was an inter-
dependence between the two religion cladses,
and has returned to the days of the "pre-
ferred position" doctrine, which considered
the two clauses to be independent of one
another.
The Notary's Oath
Shortly after the Sunday closing law
cases, the Supreme Court was again called
on to decide litigation concerning the reli-
gion clauses of the first amendment. Roy R.
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Torcaso, having been appointed by the
Governor of Maryland to the office of nota-
ry public, had been denied his commission
when he refused to sign the prescribed oath
and affirmation of the existence of God. 14'
His request for a writ of mandamus was
refused in the circuit court and later in the
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
1 42
The Supreme Court of the United States
unanimously reversed the state court's deci-
sion.1 43 Justice Black wrote the opinion of
the Court, in which all the justices joined,
except Justices Frankfurter and Harlan who
concurred in the result. After establishing
that the oath was a religious test for office
and examining the history of such tests in
England and Colonial America, he cited
Article VI of the Constitution"4 as proof
that the "test oath is abhorrent to our tradi-
tions." The first amendment, he stated, was
clearly designed to' go beyond Article VI.
The opinion went on to refute a statement
by the Maryland Court of Appeals that the
holding and opinion in Zorach 4 5 had repu-
diated the broad statements in Everson'46
and McCollum.1" 7 The Court stated:
Nothing decided or written in Zorach lends
141 This affirmation was required on the basis of
Article 37 of The Maryland Declaration of Rights,
which reads as follows: "That no religious test
ought ever to be required as a qualification for any
office of profit or trust in this State, other than a
declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor
shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of
office other than the oath prescribed by this Con-
stitution."
142 Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 438
(1960).
14.3 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
144 This article of the United States Constitution
reads: "No religious Test shall ever be required as
a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States."
145 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
146 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
147 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948).
support to the idea that the Court there
intended to open up the way for govern-
ment, state or federal, to restore the histori-
cally and constitutionally discredited policy
of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or
limiting public offices to persons who have
... a belief in some particular kind of
religious concept.14 s
The next paragraph appears to be the
core of the Court's opinion:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a
State nor the Federal Government can con-
stitutionally force a person "to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither
can constitutionally pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as
against non-believers, and neither can aid
those religions based on a belief in the
existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs.1 49
In his final paragraph Justice Black based
his opinion on what is apparently a para-
phrase of the free exercise clause:
This Maryland religious test for public office
unconstitutionally invades the appellant's
freedom of belief and religion and therefore
cannot be enforced against him. 1 0
At least some effects of the Torcaso deci-
sion are clear. The case clearly outlaws all
religious tests for public office. Dicta in the
opinion appears to invalidate any disabili-
ties of witnesses based on religious belief. In
fact, Leo Pfeffer, counsel for Torcaso, has
advanced the view that the decision should,
but will not, result in the amendment of
state and federal statutes prescribing oaths
so as to remove the phrase "so help me
God." "5
It seems also that the protection of the
free exercise clause has been extended to
include non-believers. This conclusion is
based on the first two statements of Justice
148 Torcaso v. Watkins, supra note 143, at 494.
14,9 Id. at 495.
150 Id. at 496.
151 Pfeffer, Some Current Issues in Church and
State, 13 W. REs. L. REV. 9, 33 (1961).
Black noted above. 52 Leo Pfeffer sees here
a parallel to the first amendment's guaran-
tee of freedom of non-speech and non-
listening. 51
A more interesting aspect of the Torcaso
case is the possible consequences of its defi-
nition of the term "religion." Justice Black
spoke of religions founded on beliefs other
than a belief in the existence of God.1 5 4 He
cited Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture
and Secular Humanism as examples. The
implications of this definition will be ex-
plored later in this article.
Religious Activities in the Classroom
Two recent decisions banning religious
activities in public school classrooms have
provided the clearest exposition of both the
Court's and Justice Brennan's thought about
the implications of the first amendment.
In Engel v. Vitale,'5 5 the Court upheld
the contention of parents of public school
children that the daily, non-compulsory
recitation in the classroom of a prayer com-
posed by the New York State Board of
Regents violated the establishment clause of
the first amendment. 1 56 Justice Black, writ-
ing for the majority, interpreted the clause
to mean that "it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for
any group of the American people to recite
as a part of a religious program carried on
by government." 157
He found support for this conclusion in
152 See notes 148 and 149, supra.
153 Pfeffer, supra note 151, at 32.
154Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11
(1961).
155 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
156 The prayer read: "Almighty God, we acknowl-
edge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and
our country."
157 Engel v. Vitale, supra note 155, at 422.
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the history of religious and political strife in
England in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries resulting from governmental adop-
tion of the Book of Common Prayer. To
avoid such strife the first amendment was
composed by the Founding Fathers, who
were unwilling "to let the content of their
prayers and their privilege of praying when-
ever they pleased be influenced by the ballot
box ....
Neither the denominational neutrality of
the Regents' Prayer nor the provision for
voluntary participation by the students could
remove it from the reach of the establish-
ment clause. Evidence of coercion is consti-
tutionally irrelevant when a violation of this
clause is at issue.
He concluded:
Government... should stay out of the busi-
ness of writing or sanctioning official prayers
and leave that purely religious function to
the people themselves. 159
One year later the Court reached a simi-
lar decision, but with a lengthier explana-
tion, in School Dist. of Abington Township
v. Schempp. 16 ° The reading of passages from
the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer, in essentially the same circum-
stances as in Engel, could not constitution-
ally be required by state law or a school
board under the establishment clause of the
first amendment, made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
The majority opinion, written by Justice
Clark, painstakingly develops the theme that
the first amendment demands governmental
neutrality in matters directly affecting reli-
gion or religious belief. The constitutional
test of legislation touching religion was thus
stated:
158 Id. at 429.
159 Id. at 435.
160 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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What are the purpose and the primary effect
of the enactment? If either is the advance-
ment or inhibition of religion then the enact-
ment exceeds the scope of legislative power
as circumscribed by the Constitution. That
is to say that to withstand the strictures of
the Establishment Clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.161
Justice Clark insisted that the prohibition
of these religious exercises did not result in
an establishment of a "religion of secular-
ism" in the schools. In fact, he saw no in-
consistency with the first amendment in
permitting the study of "comparative reli-
gion or the history of religion and its rela-
tionship to the advancement of civilization,"
or of the Bible "for its literary and historic
qualities." 1
62
Finally, he did not agree that the concept
of neutrality collided with the majority's
right to free exercise of religion, since the
free exercise clause has never meant that a
majority could use governmental machinery
to practice its beliefs.
In an extensive concurring opinion, 16 3
Justice Brennan set out his views on the
theory, purpose and previous judicial inter-
pretations of the religious clauses of the
first amendment.
The separation which characterizes reli-
gion-government relations is not described
by the doctrinaire "wall" metaphor.16 4
Rather it is an "elusive" line difficult to de-
fine because of the "paradox central to our
scheme of liberty," that "while our institu-
tions reflect a firm conviction that we are
a religious people, those institutions by
solemn constitutional injunction may not
161 Id. at 222.
162 Id. at 225.
163 Id. at 230.
164 Id. at 241.
involve religion in such a way as to prefer,
discriminate against, or oppress, a particu-
lar sect or religion."' 6 5 Justice Brennan care-
fully delineates the involvements of religion
with secular institutions which the Consti-
tution enjoins: (those which)
(a) serve the essentially religious activities
of religious institutions;
(b) employ the organs of government for
essentially religious purposes; or
(c) use essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends where secular
means would suffice.16
He points out, however, that "not every in-
volvement of religion in public life is un-
constitutional.' 167
Justice Brennan's opinion also provides
an insight into the relative weight which he
attaches to arguments drawn from the legis-
lative history of the religion clauses. He
accepts Justice Frankfurter's view that the
establishment clause extends beyond a mere
prevention of the setting up of an official
church.16s The prohibition of the clause
"was designed comprehensively to prevent
those official involvements of religion which
would tend to foster or discourage religious
worship or belief.' 69 The historical record is
ambiguous, however, on the issue whether
the clause covered devotional exercises in
the public schools. The more fruitful inquiry
is whether these exercises threaten the inter-
dependence between religion and govern-
ment which the Framers feared. The use of
history "must limit itself to broad purposes,
not specific practices .... It is 'a constitution
we are expounding,' and our interpretation
165 Id. at 231.
166 Ibid.
167 1d. at 232.
168 McGowan v. Maryland, 360 U.S. 420, 465-66
(1961).
169 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 160, at 232.
of the First Amendment must necessarily
be responsive to the much more highly
charged nature of religious questions in con-
temporary society."'' 0
In answer to the contentions of the school
officials, and indirectly of a large segment
of the general public, Justice Brennan con-
sidered some of the permissible forms of
accommodation between government and
religion. Such accommodation is possible in
the following instances:
1. When a too rigid interpretation of the
establishment clause would violate liberties
protected by the free exercise clause. Thus
chaplains are provided for military person-
nel and prisoners who are deprived by the
government of the opportunity of practicing
their faith at places of their choice.
2. Challenges to the recitation of prayers
in legislative halls and the appointment of
legislative chaplains are precluded by rea-
son of the maturity of the audience, the
"political" nature of the issues, and a prob-
able lack of standing to raise such challen-
ges.
3. It is still permitted to teach about the
Bible or about the differences between reli-
gious sects in literature or history classes.
4. Tax deductions and exemptions which
are generally available to educational, chari-
table and eleemosynary groups, but inciden-
tally benefit religious groups, are permis-
sible.
5. Non-discriminatory programs of gov-
ernmental aid may constitutionally include
individuals who become eligible wholly or
partially for religious reasons.
6. Activities which are religious in origin
but have ceased to have a religious meaning
are not within the scope of the establishment
clause. Into this category fall the motto, "In
170d. at 241.
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God We Trust," and various patriotic exer-
cises used in the public schools, including
the reference to God in the pledge of allegi-
ance.
While the rationale for some of the above
permissible accommodations between gov-
ernment and religion may be strained, Jus-
tice Brennan does attempt to give a unifying
theme for many of the Court's decisions
about religion in the public schools. Parental
responsibility is the prime element in the
religious and academic education of the
child. The first amendment forbids govern-
ment to inhibit the freedom of choice of the
individual parent between public and private
education, each with its own values. The
state cannot diminish "the attractiveness of
either alternative - either by restricting the
liberty of the private schools to inculcate
whatever values they wish, or by jeopardiz-
ing the freedom of the public schools from
private or sectarian pressures."'171
It is arguable that Justice Brennan would
find no constitutional difficulty in a program
of governmental aid to children attending
schools, even though church-related, and to
their parents. Their exclusion would cer-
tainly diminish and possibly destroy parental
freedom of choice. "The Framers (of the es-
tablishment clause) were not concerned," in
his opinion, "with the effects of certain inci-
dental aid to individual worshippers which
come about as by-products of general and
non-discriminatory welfare programs. '17 2
Justice Brennan has left unanswered sev-
eral major problems dealing with religion
(or its absence) in the public schools. Critics
of the Engel and Schempp-Murray decisions
maintain that, since all education involves
the inculcation of values, the elimination of
devotional exercises from the public schools
171 1d. at 242.
1721d. at 302.
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now means that only secular values will be
taught. Thus a "religion of secularism" is
established in the schools, in light of the
wide definition of the term "religion" em-
ployed in Torcaso.t, The Court has not an-
swered this argument, except to state its dis-
agreement with it. 7' One wonders, however,
whether the outlawed devotional exercises
actually had as much educational value as
their proponents claim for them.
The study of the Bible and comparative
religion will not be easily implemented by
the public schools. One can imagine ques-
tions and inevitable litigations about the
way a particular religion is taught and about
the value judgments made in comparing re-
ligions.
In retrospect, the Engel and Schempp-
Murray decisions, and in a larger sense the
neutrality principle which they enunciate,
are not philosophically and theologically
unacceptable. It has been argued that de-
mocracy, as a mode of policy formation by
majority decision, demands equality of citi-
zens and the political rights of free speech,
free assembly and free press. 17 5 Even more
important are the political rights of freedom
of religious exercise and the equality of all
religions before the law, both necessary as
means to the end of democratic decision-
making. Thus governmental neutrality, but
not hostility, toward religion, seems to be
the best guarantee that the democratic sys-
tem will continue.
173 See, e.g., Ball, "Legal" Religion in the Schools,
197 CATHOLIC WORLD 366, 371 (1963); The
School Prayer Case - Alternate Solutions, 8
CATHOLIC LAWYER 286 (1962); The School Prayer
Case: Dilemma of Disestablishment, 8 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 182 (1962); DRINAN, RELIGION, THE
COURTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 109 (1963).
174 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
175 REGAN, AMERICAN PLURALISM AND THE CATH-
OLIC CONSCIENCE 26-27 (1963).
CONCLUSION
Seven years are a comparatively short
time, and it is perhaps premature to attempt
to draw conclusions about the legal philos-
ophy of Justice Brennan with any degree of
finality. At the same time, however, one can
clearly discern the outlines of his thought
and the direction it is taking.
His general views about the first amend-
ment are clear. The rights which it guaran-
tees, particularly those of free speech and
free press, are not absolute, and in this he
differs from Justices Black and Douglas. In
the Roth case, for example, he was quite
willing to accept the fact that not every
utterance is protected by the first amend-
ment. Thus he is faced with the delicate task
of balancing the demands of the individual
with the needs of society. The cases reveal,
however, a predilection for the freedom of
the individual, and thus the scale is weighed
in advance when the balancing process be-
gins.
Justice Brennan has adopted a middle-of-
the-road policy on the question of the rela-
tionship between the Bill of Rights and the
due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. He has rejected the "incorporation"
theory advocated by Justice Black, which
held that the fourteenth amendment made
applicable to the states all the provisions of
the Bill of Rights."' But he has not swung
to Justice Frankfurter's extreme of defer-
ence to reasonable state action. As he indi-
cated in his recent lecture at New York
University,177 he favors the theory of Justice
Cardozo that some of the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights have been brought within the
fourteenth amendment by the process of
176 See, e.g., Adanison v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
177 Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36
N.Y.U.L. REV. 761, 769 (1961).
absorption.1 18 But he would give a broad
interpretation to the criterion of "ordered
liberty," which has been used by the Court
to justify the absorption of a specific guar-
antee.'7 9
The role which Justice Brennan assigns
to the Supreme Court is an active one. His
preference for protecting the individual's
rights and his desire to see more of the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights applied to
the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment lead him to con-
sider the Court as the ultimate agent to
bring about these ends. Beginning with the
Alberts case, where he disagreed with Jus-
tice Harlan concerning the standard to be
used in judging state legislation, and as re-
cently as the Engel and Schempp decisions,
where he rejected a public school's reli-
gious exercises even though surrounded by
safeguards for the rights of non-participants,
he has been a consistent advocate of Su-
preme Court supervision of state legislative,
administrative and judicial action.
His approach is not doctrinaire, however,
but rather that of the pragmatist. One does
not find in his opinions expositions of poli-
tical principles or statements of his personal
hierarchy of values. His is not the method
178 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326
(1937).
179 Brennan, supra note 177, at 773.
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of a Jeremy Bentham or a Roscoe Pound.
He is typically American in his case-by-case
approach to the solution of the questions
brought before the Court. Future decisions
will be made when they arise, not in the dicta
of a present case. The lawyer will find little
beyond the holding of the instant case to
guide future argument, and the political
theorist will find no sweeping generaliza-
tions.
Justice Brennan's judicial technique re-
minds one slightly of Justice Cardozo. It
will be recalled that the latter was ingenious
in finding a meaningful distinction between
the instant case and a line of precedent
which he did not wish to follow. Justice
Brennan's method is to scrutinize lower
court procedure. As illustrated in the ob-
scenity cases, even the slightest infringement
of a defendant's rights can be fatal to a gov-
ernment case, and thus Justice Brennan can
avoid deciding the larger constitutional
issues. Such an approach has much to rec-
ommend it.
Justice Brennan will probably not attain
the status of a Marshall or a Holmes, but he
does appear to be endowed with the humane
spirit, the intellectual integrity, the largeness
of vision, so essential in the judge con-
fronted by the issues brought before the
Supreme Court in this age of ideological
struggle.
